Information Leakage by Trace Analysis in QUAIL by Biondi, Fabrizio et al.
Information Leakage by Trace Analysis in QUAIL
Fabrizio Biondi, Jean Quilbeuf, Axel Legay
To cite this version:
Fabrizio Biondi, Jean Quilbeuf, Axel Legay. Information Leakage by Trace Analysis in QUAIL.
2014. <hal-01088208>
HAL Id: hal-01088208
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01088208
Submitted on 27 Nov 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Information Leakage by Trace Analysis in QUAIL
Fabrizio Biondi1, Jean Quilbeuf1, and Axel Legay1
Inria
Abstract. Quantitative security techniques have been proven effective to measure
the security of systems against various types of attackers. However, such tech-
niques are based on computing exponentially large channel matrices or Markov
chains, making them impractical for large programs. We propose a different ap-
proach based on abstract trace analysis. By analyzing directly sets of execution
traces of the program and computing security measures on the results, we are
able to scale down the exponential cost of the problem. Also, we are able to appy
statistical simulation techniques, allowing us to obtain significant results even
without exploring the full space of traces. We have implemented the resulting
algorithms in the QUAIL tool. We compare their effectiveness against the state of
the art LeakWatch tool on two case studies: privacy of user consumption in smart
grid systems and anonymity of voters in different voting schemes.
1 Introduction
The protection of privacy and data security is one of the main concerns of computer
science. Security often falls down to the impossibility for an attacker to obtain a given
secret value. Such an impossibility can be defined by non-interference [14]. However
this definition rejects any program which publishes any variable whose value depends
on the secret. For instance, publishing the results of an election when each individual
vote is secret breaks non-interference. Such a yes/no approach do not consider that an
attacker may have a partial information about a secret.
Information-theoretical techniques have the advantage of considering the secret not
as an atomic object but as a known number of secret bits, allowing the definition of
measures of effectiveness of an attack based on the amount of secret bits that the attack
compromises. The amount of secret bits that are compromised by an attack are known as
information leakage. Leakage depends on the information about the secret known to the
attacker before the attack, known as prior information and usually modeled as a prior
probability distribution over the values of the secret. This approach dates back to Denning
[13]. Different information leakage measures have been introduced, including Shannon
leakage [15], min-entropy leakage [21] and the g-leakage [1], encoding different security
properties of the system. Among the results in the field, Köpf et al. studied leakage of
side-channel attacks [2,16], while Boreale has defined leakage for process calculi [6]
and characterized the best attack strategy of an adaptive attacker [7].
In previous work, we have presented a quantitative analysis technique able to pre-
cisely quantify information leakage of a system to an arbitrary number of decimal digits
after modeling a system-attacker scenario with a Markov chain and analyzing it by
applying results in both information theory and graph theory [4]. The method has been
implemented in our QUantitative Analyzer for Information Leakage (QUAIL) tool1 [5].
To our knowledge, QUAIL is the only tool enabling precise and exact information
leakage computation, and later tools by multiple authors have used it as comparison
[11,19]. Nonetheless, QUAIL needs to produce a full Markov chain model of the system-
attacker scenario to produce a meaningful result. Such chain has an exponential number
of states in the size of the secrets and observables, making it cumbersome to compute.
The first contribution of this paper is a new algorithm for precise information leakage
computation, which we call Exhaustive Trace Exploration (Exp). The algorithm is able
to compute information leakage following the same Markovian semantics we introduced
previously [4, Section 4] by analyzing the execution traces of the system. This avoids
building the full Markov chain model of the system.
The Exp algorithm performs an exhaustive depth-first exploration of all system
traces, so that every trace is explored exactly once. The probability and information
leakage of each trace is computed, and the information leakage of the system is obtained
as the expected value of the information leakage over all traces.
We will show the effectiveness of the algorithm by comparing it with the previous
QUAIL implementation and the state of the art LeakWatch tool [11]. LeakWatch is the
most recent of a family of tools for statistical approximation of information leakage
developed by Chothia et al. [10,12]. LeakWatch analyzes Java code, requiring the
programmer to annotate the code of the system with secret and observable values,
then simulates the system repeatedly using the Java Virtual Machine and estimates the
correlation between the secret and observable values. LeakWatch follows a different
perspective than QUAIL, since the former simulates the full program a large amount of
times to produce an approximated result while the latter performs a single full abstract
exploration of the traces of the system to produce the exact value of the leakage.
The second contribution of this paper is the presentation of two scalable case studies
for quantitative information leakage analysis and the comparison of LeakWatch and
QUAIL on these case studies. The case studies are anonymity of user data in Smart Grids
and privacy comparison in voting protocols.
Smart Grids are in the family of interconnected objects and have received a growing
interest over the last years. Our case study is based on a real system deployed at fortiss2
labs [17]. In our case study, we focus on the negotiation between a set of prosumers and
an aggregator. The prosumers (PROducer conSUMERs) consume, store and produce
energy. To stabilize the grid, the prosumers negotiate with the aggregator how much
energy they will exchange with the grid for the next period of time. This exchange
might expose the consumption of one of the prosumers, and, in turn, allow a potential
attacker to deduce that a house is empty or that a factory has increased its production. In
that example, the difficulty is to decide not only whether the exact information can be
deduced or not, but also how well an attack can approximate it. Measuring the leakage
with QUAIL indicates how much of the secret is unveiled through the negotiation phase.
We show that increasing the number of prosumers also increases security.
1 http://project.inria.fr/quail
2 http://fortiss.org
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In the voting protocols comparison case study, we compare two different voting
protocols: the Single Preference where each voter expresses a single vote for his favorite
candidate, and the Preference Ranking where each voter ranks all candidates from his
most to his least favorite. In both case there are multiple voters and candidates, and the
secret is the preference of each voter. Both protocols have a large number of possible
secrets and outputs, so they become cumbersome to analyze with both QUAIL and
LeakWatch with a small number of voters and candidates. We show that the Preference
Ranking protocol is more effective in protecting the privacy of the voters, and that
QUAIL can prove it significantly faster and with more precision than LeakWatch. In
general, the size of the secret is an important parameter for the comparison: LeakWatch
perfoms better on systems with a small secret, while QUAIL scales better with the size
of the secret.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces standard concepts
and notations. In Section 3 we present the algorithms for leakage computation via
trace analysis. Section 4 elaborates on the case studies, and finally Section 5 discusses
statistical extensions of the algorithms presented.
2 Information Leakage with QUAIL
We want to compute the information leakage of a program, i.e. a measure quantifying
how much information an attacker infers about the program’s secret by observing the
program’s output. We assume that the attacker has access to the program’s source code,
unlimited computational power, and some prior information about the secret (e.g. the bit
size of the secret). Leakage corresponds to the reduction in the attacker’s uncertainty
about the secret.
Let h be a random variable with values in a domainD(h) representing the value of the
secret and o be a random variable with values in a domainD(o) modeling the value of the
output. The information the attacker has on the secret is modeled by a discrete probability
distribution, i.e. for a discrete random variable X a function pi : D(X) → [0, 1] such
that
∑
x∈D(X) pi(x) = 1. The information that the attacker has on the secret before the
attack is modeled by the prior distribution pi(h) while the information the attacker has
after observing the output is modeled by the posterior distribution pi(h|o). We consider
the prior distribution as given, since it is part of the model of the attacker. Let U be an
uncertainty measure defined on probability distributions, including Shannon entropy,
min-entropy, and g-vulnerability. Computing leakage for the measure U reduces to
computing the prior and posterior distributions and applying the formula
LeakageU = U(pi(h))− U(pi(h|o)) (1)
= U(pi(h))−
∑
o¯∈D(o)
pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯)) (2)
We present the syntax of the QUAIL imperative language we use to model programs.
We distinguish the variables in public and private variables according to their level of
abstraction: public variables have precise values, while private variables have sets of
possible values. The observable variable o is public, while the secret variable h is private.
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Let v (resp.h) range over names of public (resp. private) variables and x range over reals
from [0; 1]. Let L (resp. H) be the set of assignments of values to public variables (resp.
sets of values to private variables). Assume that the secret is a private variable h taking
values in a known domain D(h) and the observable is a public variable o taking values
in a known domain D(o).
Let label denote program points and f (g) pure arithmetic (Boolean) expressions.
Assume a standard set of expressions and the following statements:
stmt ::= public intn v | private intn h | v := f(L) | v := rand x |
skip | goto label | return | if g(L,H) then goto label_a
else goto label_b
The first statement declares a public variable v of size n bits with a given value k,
while the second statement similarly declares a private variable h of size n bits with
allowed values ranging from 0 to 2n− 1. The third statement assigns to a public variable
the value of expression f depending on public variables; assignment to private variables
or depending on the value of private variables is not allowed. The fourth statement
assigns zero with probability x, and one with probability 1−x, to a public variable. The
return statement outputs values of all public variables and terminates. A conditional
branch first evaluates an expression g dependent on private and public variables, and it
jumps to label label_a if g is true and to label_a otherwise.
Since only a single variable scope exists, loops can be added in a standard way as a
syntactic sugar.
3 Information Leakage by Trace Analysis
We present a method to compute information leakage of a program by analyzing the
execution traces of the program. We present in Subsection 3.1 how a single trace is
produced according to the markovian semantics of our langage. Subsection 3.2 presents
how the leakage is computed from a multiset of final states. Subsections 3.3 and 3.4
present the Exp algorithm and details about its distributed implementation. The Exp
algorithm explores all the traces to produce the multiset of final states needed to compute
the leakage.
3.1 Single Trace Analysis
The Markovity of the semantics allows us to define states containing enough information
to determine a probability distribution over all traces originating from any state.
Definition 1. A state in a Markovian semantics is a tuple (pc, L,H, p) where pc ∈ N0
is the program counter, L an assignment function assigning a value to each public
variable, H an assignment function assigning a set of values to each private variable,
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is the probability of the state.
The initial state of the semantics is (1, ∅, ∅, 1). The successor states of a state
(pc, L,H, p) depend on the statement pointed at by the program counter pc, as shown in
the semantics in Figure 1.
4
pc: public intn v := k
(pc, L,H, p)→ (pc + 1, L ∪ {(L(v) = k, n)}, H, p)
pc: private intn h
(pc, L,H, p)→ (pc + 1, L,H ∪ {H(h) = {0, ..., 2n − 1}, n)}, p)
pc: skip
(pc, L,H, p)→ (pc + 1, L,H, p)
pc: v := f(L)
(pc, L,H, p)→ (pc + 1, L ∪ {(L(v) = f(L), n)}, H, p)
pc: v := rand x
(pc, L,H, p)→ (pc + 1, L[0/v], H, p · x), (pc + 1, L[1/v], H, p · (1− x))
pc: goto label
(pc, L,H, p)→ (label, L,H, p)
pc: return
terminate
pc: if g(L,H) then la: A else lb: B
(pc, L,H, p)→ (la, L,H|g(L,H), p · Pr(g(L, H)|pi(h))),
(lb, L,H|¬g(L,H), p · Pr(¬g(L, H)|pi(h)))
Fig. 1: Execution rules in Markovian trace semantics.
We call a state final if the program counter of the state points to a return statement.
The trace analysis terminates when a final state is encountered. This means that the anal-
ysis terminates if and only if the program under analysis terminates, so non-terminating
programs cannot be analyzed with this technique. We refer to our work in the subject to
handle the computation of leakage of non-terminating programs [3].
To analyze a single execution trace, we start from a given Markov state (pc, L,H, p),
e.g. the initial state (1, ∅, ∅, 1). The program counter points to the line in the source code
to be executed according to the semantics in Figure 1.
Conditional states and random assignment states have two successors. The successors
of a conditional state correspond to the guard being true or false. Since the guard can
depend on the secret, both successor states may have positive probability depending on
the prior distribution pi(h) on the secret, which is available at this time. The successors
of a random assignment state correspond to the bit being set to 0 or 1. In both cases
the probability of each successor state is computed and one of the successor states with
positive probability is chosen to be the next step in the analysis.
Because of the Markovian semantics, each state contains the information to compute
the probability distribution over its outgoing transitions. The probability of a trace is
computed as the product of the probabilities of the transitions composing the trace.
In the successor states of the conditional statement, H|g(L,H) (resp. H|¬g(L,H))
represents the assignment function obtained by removing from the sets of values assigned
to the private variables those values that contradict (resp. respect) the guard g(L,H).
Similarly, Pr(g(L,H)|pi(h)) (resp. Pr(¬g(L,H)|pi(h))) refers to the probability
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Data: uncertainty measure U , multiset Q of final states
Result: posterior uncertainty U(pi(h|o))
1 Initialize pi(o) and all pi(h, o = o¯) to zero;
2 forall the s = (pc, L,H, p) ∈ Q do
3 Let o¯ = L(o), {k1, ..., kn} = H(h);
4 Set pi(o = o¯)← pi(o = o¯) + p;
5 for i = 1...n do
6 Set pi(h = ki, o = o¯)← pi(h = ki, o = o¯) + p/n;
7 end
8 end
9 For each o¯ ∈ D(o) let pi(h|o = o¯)← pi(h, o = o¯)/pi(o = o¯);
10 Return U(pi(h|o)) =∑o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯))
Algorithm 1: Posterior uncertainty computation
that the guard g(L,H) is true (resp. false) considering the prior probability distribution
pi(h) on the private variables.
When a single trace analysis terminates, a given final state (p¯c, L¯, H¯, p¯) is produced,
in which pc points to a return statement. The sets of allowed values assigned to the
private variables in H¯ have been appropriately reduced to account for the conditional
statements visited by the trace.
3.2 Posterior Uncertainty Computation Algorithm
We show how to compute the posterior uncertainty U(pi(h|o)) of a system with a secret
h and an observable o, given the uncertainty measure U and a multiset Q of final states
of the system. Q encodes the posterior joint probability of all variables in the system and
can be produced by the Exp algorithm presented in Section 3.3.
Let (pc, L,H, p) be a final state in Q, where L represents the assignments of given
values to the public variables,H the assignments of sets of values to the private variables,
and p the joint probability of such assignments. Since different traces may produce
the same final assignments to variables (L,H), the joint probability of these assign-
ments is the sum of the probabilities of all such final states. To apply the formula (2)
U(pi(h|o)) = ∑o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯)), we need to compute the marginal
probability distribution pi(o) and for each observable output o¯ ∈ D(o) s.t. pi(o = o¯) > 0
the corresponding conditional probability distribution on h, i.e. pi(h|o = o¯).
Algorithm 1 computes pi(o) and each pi(h|o = o¯) by analyzing a multiset of final
states. For each state (pc, L,H, p) the value of the observable variable o and set of
values of the secret variable h are analyzed. The probability of observing the value o¯ of
the observable variable in the state is increased by p, and the probability of observing
each of the n values of the secret variable conditioned on o¯ is increased by p/n. Finally,
the probability on each subdistribution pi(h, o = o¯) is normalized to 1 by dividing it by
pi(o = o¯) to obtain the conditional probability pi(h|o = o¯).
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 terminates, and when it does it outputs the posterior uncer-
tainty U(pi(h|o)) of the posterior distribution represented by Q.
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Data: uncertainty measure U , prior distribution pi(h), imperative code of the program
Result: leakage of the program according to U
1 Initialize an empty multiset Q;
2 Put the initial state (1, ∅, ∅, 1) on the stack S;
3 while stack S is not empty do
4 Pop a state s = (pc, L,H, p) from the stack S;
5 while s is not a final state do
6 Find the successors s1, ..., sn of s that have positive probability;
7 Put s2, ...sn on the stack S;
8 Assign s := s1;
9 end
10 Add s to Q;
11 end
12 Return U(pi(h))−ComputePosteriorUncertainty(U,Q);
Algorithm 2: Exp: Exhaustive depth-first trace exploration
3.3 Exhaustive Trace Exploration Algorithm
We present the Exhaustive Trace Exploration Algorithm (Exp) for the efficient computa-
tion of information leakage of a program written in an imperative code equipped with
Markovian semantics. The algorithm can be used to compute any information-theoretical
measure of leakage, including Shannon leakage, min-entropy leakage, guessing entropy
and g-leakage. In the algorithm, the prior and posterior distributions of the attacker
are computed, and information leakage is computed as the difference between the
value of the chosen measure on the prior and posterior distribution, following common
practice in the field. The algorithm can be parallelized to take advantage of multicore
architectures and is implemented in the current release of the QUAIL tool, available at
http://project.inria.fr/quail. Details about the implementation are given in Section 3.4.
The Exp algorithm perform a depth-first exhaustive exploration of the execution
traces of the system. Each trace is explored until it gets to a final state, then the final state
gets added to the multiset Q of final states. When a state with more than one successor
is found during the exploration of a trace, one of the successor state is chosen as the
next state to explore and all other successors are put on the stack of the states still to be
explored, following a depth-first strategy. We refer back to Section 3.1 for details about
the analysis of a single trace. When all traces have been explored, Exp has produced the
full multiset of final statesQ of the system. The algorithm then computes the information
leakage of the system using Algorithm 1. The pseudocode of the algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 2. The following theorem proves the correctness of the algorithm:
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 terminates on a terminating program and when it does it
outputs the information leakage according to the given uncertainty measure U .
3.4 Distributed Implementation
Algorithm Exp is highly parallelizable, and can be implemented to take advantage of
multicore and distributed systems. To parallelize it, the stack S and the set Q of final
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states must be shared between the processes. Different processes can pop states from S,
explore the corresponding traces until they find final states, and add those final states
to Q. To avoid race conditions, access to both S and Q must be sequential. QUAIL
currently implements this strategy on multicore systems.
Algorithm 1 can also be parallelized. Divide Q in subsets Qo¯ = {s ∈ Q|o = o¯ in s}
for each output o¯. It is then possible to utilize a different process for each output o¯ to
analyze each set Qo¯ and compute the probability and conditional posterior uncertainty
of o¯ independently from each other.
4 Case Studies
We compare different leakage analysis tools on two case studies. In the first one, we
measure information about occupancy of an house based on the information obtained
through a Smart Grid. In the second one, we compare the loss of anonymity of the
voters due to the publication of the results of an election with different voting proto-
cols.In both case we measure Shannon leakage, setting U(pi(h)) =
∑
h¯∈D(h) pi(h =
h¯) log2 pi(h = h¯). The code of all the case studies presented in this paper is available at
https://project.inria.fr/quail/tacas15/.
For our both case studies, we compare Exp with LeakWatch [11]. On the first case
study we also compare Exp with the previous algorithm implemented in QUAIL [4].
LeakWatch evaluates the leakage in Java programs by approximating it from a statistical
sample of program executions. In order to run our case studies with LeakWatch, we
translate the QUAIL code into Java code. This translation is straightforward except
for the declaration of private variables. To handle them, we replace each interval in a
declaration by an assignment to a random number within that interval. For instance, the
declaration
secret array [N] of int32 vote : = [ 0 ,C−1];
becomes
for ( i n t i ; i <N ; i ++) vote [ i ] = securerandom . nex t I n t (C) ;
Then we instrument the code to define the secret and observable variables by using
the LeakWatch API. In our example, defining the vote as secret and the results as
observable is obtained through:
for ( i n t i ; i <N ; i ++) LeakWatchAPI . secret ( ’ vote [ i ] ’ , vote [ i ] ) ;
for ( i n t j ; j <C ; j ++) LeakWatchAPI . observe ( r e s u l t [ j ] ) ;
After compilation of the instrumented code, the analysis is run by the command java
-jar leakwatch-0.5.jar SinglePreference. This executes the
SinglePreference class several times and records the secrets and observables
to compute the leakage. LeakWatch determines at runtime how much simulations are
necessary to obtain a good approximation of the leakage.
4.1 Smart Grid
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Fig. 2: Smart grid overview
A Smart Grid is an energy network where
every node may produce, store and con-
sume energy. Nodes are called prosumers
(PROducer consSUMERS). The Living
Lab demonstrator [17], is an instance of
such a prosumer, whose data can be ac-
cessed online3. Without coordination be-
tween the prosumers, the grid may globally consume or produce too much energy,
making it unstable. To stabilize the grid, the prosumers periodically negotiate with
an aggregator in charge of balancing the consumption and production among several
prosumers. Figure 2 depicts a grid with 3 prosumers. Each prosumer declares its plan,
that is, how much it intends to consume or produce during the next period of time. The
aggregator sends back a value indicating the excess of energy production or consump-
tion. An excess of 0 indicates that the announced plans are feasible and terminates the
negotiation. Otherwise, the prosumers then have to adapt their plan accordingly and send
the updated version.
Switching to a smart grid structure will probably be required in the coming years.
Smart grid and smart sensors raise several security and privacy concerns. The plat-
form can ensure the information cannot flow directly between prosumers [9]. However,
stability requires a feedback from the aggregator that potentially conveys infomation
about other prosumer, where only the software can limit information leakage. In gen-
eral, knowing the consumption of a particular household may reveal some sensitive
information about the house (presence of people in the house, type of electrical devices
. . . ). Therefore, the consumption of a prosumer should remain secret. The privacy of a
prosumer with respect to the aggregator can be ensured in several ways [20]. However,
each prosumer receives some information about the consumption of other prosumers
through the excess value sent back by the aggregator.
Table 1: Consumption of
houses wrt size
Size Case 1 Case 2
Small 1 1
Medium 2 3
Large 3 5
An attacker might try to use the information obtained
through the grid in order to decide whether a given house
is occupied or not. In our scenario, we assume different
types of houses with different consumptions. Each house
is modeled by a private boolean value, which is true if the
house is occupied. An occupied house consumes a fixed
amount of energy, according to its type. An empty house does not consume anything.
Table 1 presents how much a given house consumes, in two different cases that we
consider.
For our analyses, we assume that the attacker observes the global consumption, de-
clared by: observable int32 global_consumption;. We consider two variants, depending
on whether the attacker focuses on a single house or on all the houses. The secret is
either the occupancy of one particular house: secret int1 presence_target:=[0,1]; or the
occupancy of all houses: secret array [N] of int1 presence:=[0,1];
Table 2 shows the results of several leakage analyses. The first two columns indicates
the case, as presented in Table 1 and the number of houses in the model. For a model
with N houses, there is N/3 house of each type. The columns S, M and L indicates the
3 livinglab.fortiss.org
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leakage of the variable representing the vacancy of an house of this type. The column
“Global leakage” contains the leakage of the whole array of occupancy bits and the
column “Global leakage/bit” indicates the average leak for one bit of secret.
Table 2: Leakage of occupancy through the global
consumption
Nb of Single house leakage Global Global
Case Houses S M L leakage leakage/bit
0 3 0.7500 0.7500 0.7500 2.7500 0.9166
0 6 0.0688 0.1466 0.2944 3.4210 0.5701
0 9 0.0214 0.0768 0.1771 3.7363 0.4151
0 12 0.0135 0.0544 0.1273 3.9479 0.3289
1 3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 1.0000
1 6 0.1965 0.1965 0.3687 4.0243 0.6707
1 9 0.0241 0.0808 0.2062 4.3863 0.4873
1 12 0.0074 0.0510 0.1443 4.6064 0.3838
Table 3: Time to compute the leak-
age for a large house
Case House Time Time Time
Nb MC Exp LW
1 3 0.4s 0.1s 0.3s
1 6 1.6s 0.4s 0.3s
1 9 91.4s 1.0s 0.4s
1 12 timeout 2.6s 0.4s
2 3 0.4s 0.1s 0.3s
2 6 1.6s 0.4s 0.5s
2 9 92.1s 1.0s 0.4s
2 12 timeout 2.7s 0.4s
The average leakage per bit from a global attack is more important that the informa-
tion obtained by focusing on a single bit. This means than obtaining information about
the whole array, for instance the number of occupied houses, is easier than obtaining
information about a single bit, i.e. occupancy of a single house. In both cases, the leakage,
and thus the anonymity of prosumers, diminishes when the number of houses increases.
In Table 3 we compare the execution time between the previous QUAIL algorithm
that builds a global Markov chain from the program, Exp and LeakWatch. The Exp
algorithm is much faster as it needs 3s to perform a computation that requires more than
one hour (the timeout value) with the previous algorithm. LeakWatch needs less than
1s on the same example. This experiment validates the fact than LeakWatch performs
better than Exp when the size of the secret is small (1 bit here).
4.2 Voting protocols
In an election, each voter is called to express his preference for the competing candidates.
The voting system defines the way the voters express their preference: either on paper in
a traditional election, or electronically in e-voting. The voting system also comprehends
the additional procedures enforced to guarantee that the voters can vote freely, that they
can verify that their vote has been counted and that their vote remains confidential.
After the votes have been cast, the results of the vote are published, usually in an
aggregated form to protect the anonymity of the voters. Finally, the winning candidate
or candidates is chosen according to a given electoral formula.
In this section we present two different typologies of voting, representing two
different ways in which the voters can express their preference: in the Single Preference
protocol the voters declare their preference for exactly one of the candidates, while in the
Preference Ranking protocol each voter ranks the candidate from his most favorite to his
least favorite. Since each protocol we model is concerned only about how the votes are
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expressed and counted and what results are published, each protocol models a number
of electoral formulae. For the same reason, the models are valid both for uninominal and
multinominal elections.
Single Preference The Single Preference protocol typology models all electoral for-
mulae in which each of the N voters expresses one vote for one of the C candidates,
including plurality and majority voting systems and single non-transferable vote [18].
The votes for each candidate are summed up and only the results are published, thus
hiding information about which voter voted for which candidate. The candidate or
candidates to be elected are decided according to the electoral formula used.
The secrets and observables are modeled by the following lines of QUAIL code:
secret array [N] of int32 vote : = [ 0 ,C−1];
observable array [C] of int32 r e s u l t ;
The secret is an array of integers with a value for each of the N voters. Each value is a
number from 0 to C− 1, representing a vote for one of the C candidates. The observable
is an array of integers with the votes obtained by each of the C candidates.
The protocol is simple, and its information leakage can be computed formally, as
shown by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The information leakage for the Single Preference protocol with n voters
and c candidates corresponds to
−
∑
k1+k2+...+kc=n
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
log2
(
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
)
The proof for Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. While the lemma characterizes the
solution computed by QUAIL for this case, it is very hard to find such a characterization
for any process, so in general QUAIL is the best way to obtain a result. We run QUAIL
with the command ./quail single_preference.quail -v 0 -p 5 and
obtain 1.8112 showing that the leakage of the Single Preference protocol for 3 voters
and 2 candidates is ≈ 1.8112 bits.
Preference Ranking The Preference Ranking protocol typology models all electoral
formulae in which each of the n voters expresses an order of preference of the c can-
didates, including the alternative vote and single transferable vote systems [18]. In the
Preferential Voting protocol the voter does not express a single vote, but rather a ranking
of the candidates; thus if the candidates are A, B, C and D the voter could express the fact
that he prefers B, then D, then C and finally A. Then each candidate gets c points for each
time he appears as first choice, c− 1 points for each time he appears as second choice,
and so on. The points of each candidate are summed up and the results are published.
The secrets and observables are modeled by the following lines of QUAIL code:
secret array [N] of int32 vote : = [ 0 ,C!−1] ;
observable array [C] of int32 r e s u l t ;
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The secret is an array of integers with a value for each of the N voters. Each value
is a number from 0 to C! − 1, representing one of the possible C! rankings of the C
candidates. The observable is an array of integers with the points obtained by each of the
C candidates. The full model for this protocol is shown in the Appendix due to space
constraints.
Table 4: Voting protocols: percent of secret leaked by Single Preference (on the left) and
Preference Ranking (on the right)
SP Candidates
2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 60.4 % 65.7 % 69.0 % 71.3 % 73.0 %
4 50.8 % 56.5 % 60.2 % 62.9 % 64.9 %
5 44.0 % 49.6 % 53.5 % 56.4 % 58.6 %
6 38.9 % 44.4 % 48.3 % 51.2 % 53.5 %
PR Candidates
2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 60.4 % 61.9 % 62.0 %
4 50.8 % 51.0 % timeout
5 44.0 % 43.4 % timeout
6 38.9 % 37.9 % timeout
Experimental Results Table 4 shows the percentage of the secret leaked by the Sin-
gle Preference and Preference Ranking protocols for different numbers of voters and
candidates. We note that the results for 2 candidates are identical, since in this case in
both protocols the voters can vote in only 2 different ways. The results obtained for
Single Preference are correct with respect to the formula stated in Lemma 1. The table
shows that the Single Preference protocol leaks a greater percentage of its secret than
the Preference Ranking protocol.
Table 5: Percent error of the leakage obtained by LeakWatch relatively to the one from
QUAIL for Single Preference (on the left) and Preference Ranking (on the right)
SP Candidates
2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 -3.8 % -3.7 % -3.2 % -2.8 % -2.2 %
4 -5.1 % -3.7 % -2.6 % -2.3 % -2.1 %
5 -5.0 % -3.2 % -2.6 % -2.2 % -1.9 %
6 -5.1 % -3.2 % -2.4 % timeout timeout
PR Candidates
2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 -3.8 % -2.6 % timeout
4 -5.1 % -2.6 % timeout
5 -5.0 % -2.2 % timeout
6 -5.1 % timeout timeout
Table 5 shows the percent error of the leakage value obtained with LeakWatch.
Indeed, LeakWatch computes an approximation of the leakage based on simulation,
whereas QUAIL computes the exact value. For this reason, the leakage computed by
LeakWatch for a given program may change at each invocation of the tool. LeakWatch
slightly underestimates the leakage.
We compare the execution time of QUAIL and LeakWatch in Table 6 for Single
Preference and in Table 7 for Preference Ranking. These execution times have been
obtained on a laptop with a i7 quad-core running at 3.3Ghz and 16G of ram. The results
show that QUAIL is significantly faster than LeakWatch on these examples. For Single
12
Preference with 6 candidates and 5 voters, QUAIL is 200 times faster than LeakWatch.
This shows that QUAIL performs better than LeakWatch with large secrets.
Table 6: Time in seconds needed to compute the leakage for Single Preference with
QUAIL (on the left) and LeakWatch (on the right). Timeout is set to one hour.
SP Candidates
QUAIL 2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
4 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.7
5 0.3 0.9 2.5 6.8 13.3
6 0.5 2.8 13.3 56.7 214.4
SP Candidates
LW 2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 0.4 0.8 2.5 6.9 19.1
4 0.5 2.4 14.1 64.6 232.3
5 0.7 8.1 81.6 549.4 2688.3
6 1.1 29.0 481.6 timeout timeout
Table 7: Time in seconds needed to compute the leakage for Preference Ranking with
QUAIL (on the left) and LeakWatch (on the right). Timeout is set to one hour.
PR Candidates
QUAIL 2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 0.3 2.0 89.4
4 0.4 9.0 timeout
5 0.7 76.7 timeout
6 1.1 2987.8 timeout
PR Candidates
LW 2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 0.4 13.7 timeout
4 0.5 121.0 timeout
5 0.8 1267.3 timeout
6 1.2 timeout timeout
5 Towards Statistical Estimation: A Perspective
One of the reasons why LeakWatch is faster than the Exp algorithm in some examples is
that the former just computes an approximation of the leakage, while the latter computes
the precise result. This requires Exp to explore the totality of the execution traces of the
system. However, since the space of traces is generally very large, it would be interesting
to be able to analyze only a statistically significant sample of the traces and to estimate
the leakage of the system based on the sample.
Statistical computation of information leakage has been explored by the group of
Tom Chothia, leading to the development of the LeakWatch tool we compare against,
while Boreale proves that no Monte Carlo estimator exists under very mild conditions for
the estimation of channel capacity [8], a problem closely related to information leakage.
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Data: uncertainty measure U , prior distribution pi(h), imperative code of the program
Result: leakage of the program according to U
1 Initialize an empty set Q;
2 while termination conditions are not met do
3 Let s := (1, ∅, ∅, 1);
4 while s is not a return state do
5 Find the successors s1, ..., sn of s;
6 Assign to s one of its successors chosen randomly;
7 end
8 Add s to Q;
9 end
10 Return U(pi(h))−ComputePosteriorUncertainty(U,Q);
Algorithm 3: Statistical trace simulation
Statistical estimation of leakage via trace analysis would follow a different path, as
explained in Algorithm 3. We call this algorithm Sim. The Sim algorithm randomly
chooses traces to analyze, and terminates when some termination conditions are met.
Such conditions can include a certain number or percentage of traces analyzed or a
time limit. Contrarily to Exp, Sim may analyze the same trace twice. In that case, the
resulting final state should be added only once to the set Q. This can be obtained by
enriching the state s with a hash value depending on the trace producing the final state
s. After the analysis, leakage is computed from the data available. Compared to Monte
Carlo techniques, Sim has the advantage that since we know the probability of each trace
explored, the percentage of the probability space actually covered by the simulation is
known. In case not all final states are contained in Q, the distribution pi(o) computed by
Algorithm 1 will be a subdistribution. In this case we increase the posterior uncertainty
accordingly, assuming that the unanalyzed part of the posterior distribution behaves like
the part that has been analyzed. This assumption is valid only if the final states in Q have
been produced by statistically independent analyses, so that they represent a meaningful
sample of the full set of final states.
Finally, note that in Algorithm 3 we are choosing the successor state to explore
randomly and locally, so the probability of analyzing a trace does not correspond with
the probability of the trace. This is useful when some of the traces have a very low
probability, as it is often the case with authentication protocols. This kind of rare event
simulation is a well established approach in probabilistic model checking. In practice we
are simulating for a prior distribution pi(h) but choosing the traces to simulate according
to a different prior distribution pi′(h) that generates more interesting traces with a higher
probability. This begs for the question of which prior pi′(s) allows us to explore the trace
space more efficiently, thus providing a more meaningful sample in a shorter time. We
leave this question open as future work.
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A Appendix
Proof (of Theorem 1). Termination of Algorithm 1 is trivial if Q is finite. For the
soundness, the algorithm computes posterior uncertainty according to the uncertainty
measure U using the formula
U(pi(h|o)) =
∑
o¯∈D(o)
pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯))
The computation reduces to finding the probability distribution pi(o) on the observable
variable and the conditional probability distribution on the secret pi(h|o = o¯) for each
possible value o¯ of the observable variable.
Let Qo¯ be the set {(pc, L,H, p) ∈ Q | L(o) = o¯}, and let p(Qo¯) be the sum of the
probabilities p of the states in Qo¯. Then pi(o = o¯) = p(Qo¯). Since the sets Qo¯ for each
o¯ form a partition of Q, then
∑
o¯∈D(o) p(Qo¯) =
∑
o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯) = 1, proving that
pi(o) is a probability distribution.
Similarly, let h¯ = {k1, . . . , kn} and Qo¯,h¯ be the set {(pc, L,H, p) ∈ Qo¯ | H(h) =
h¯} and let p(Qo¯,h¯) be the sum of the probabilities p of the states in Qo¯,h¯. Then each state
inQo¯,h¯ represents a fragment of the the joint distribution on (o, h) that is uniform on h¯ =
{k1, ..., kn}, and pi(o = o¯, h ∈ {k1, ..., kn}) = p(Qo¯,h¯). The conditional probability of
each value of h conditioned by a given o¯ ∈ D(o) is computed as pi(h|o = o¯) = pi(o=o¯,h)pi(o=o¯)
by the normalization in line 9.
Having computed pi(o) and all pi(h|o = o¯), we compute posterior uncertainty with
the formula presented above.
Proof (of Theorem 2). We assume that the program under analysis always terminates,
i.e. all traces reach a final state in a finite number of steps. The analysis of a single trace
follows the Markovian semantics of the language, as explained in Section 3.1.
The algorithm explores the tree of computation traces following a depth-first strategy.
Since all traces terminate, eventually all of them are explored and the setQ contains all of
the possible final states of the system. Note that the exploration also depends on the prior
distribution pi(h): values of the secret with a probability zero in the prior distribution are
not explored. This behavior is intended, as is avoids unnecessarily exploring traces that
have probability zero.
When the full set Q of final states has been produces the algorithm uses Algorithm 1
to compute the posterior uncertainty and applies the formula
LeakageU = U(pi(h))− U(pi(h|o)) (3)
so the proof of correctness is a consequence of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: The information leakage for the Single Preference protocol with n voters and
c candidates corresponds to
−
∑
k1+k2+...+kc=n
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
log2
(
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
)
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Proof. It is known that, since the program is deterministic, its Shannon leakage corre-
sponds to the entropy H(pi(o)) of the distribution over the output [4]. We compute
H(pi(o)) = −
∑
o∈D(o)
pi(o) log2(pi(o))
Here o corresponds to a possible output, which is, in our case a vote result. A vote result
precises, for each candidate j, the number kj of votes obtained. Furthermore, the total
of all votes is the number of voters v. Thus the domain of o is D(o) = {k1, . . . , kc ∈
N |∑cj=1 kj = n}. The number of votes with result o = k1, . . . , kc correspond to the
number of choices of voters for candidate 1 amongst n, i.e.
(
n
k1
)
, times the number of
choice of voters for candidate 2 amongst the ones remaining i.e.
(
n−k1
k2
)
and so on. The
result is
c∏
i=1
(
n−∑i−1j=1 kj
ki
)
which simplifies to n!k1!k2!...kc! . As the votes are equiprobable, we have p(k1, . . . , kc) =
n!
cnk1!k2!...kc!
, hence the result. uunionsq
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